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CIVIL PROCEDURE: The Use of Collateral Estoppel
and the Implications on the Multiple Trials Flowing
from a Denial of Class Certification-Dodge v. Cotter
Corporation
SUSAN R. JOHNSON*
I. INTRODUCTION
In the Tenth Circuit, the results from a bellwether' trial that has resulted from a
denial of class action status will not be binding on future litigation, regardless of
whether the elements of collateral estoppel are met, unless an agreement to do so is
2 five hundred plaintiffs
made between the parties. In Dodge v. Cotter Corporation,
filed for class action status but were denied. Following that ruling, the parties
selected eight bellwether plaintiffs for the first trial. A second set of trials followed
and the plaintiffs tried to use non-mutual, offensive collateral estoppel against Cotter
Corporation but were denied. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals held that collateral
estoppel did not preclude litigation of claims in the second set of trials because the
elements of collateral estoppel were not met. The elements required for collateral
estoppel are clarified in the case presented in this Note. In this case, the court stated
that the plaintiffs failed to meet one of those requirements; the plaintiffs did not
clearly prove that the issues presented in the second trial were identical to the claims
litigated in a previous bellwether trial. The Tenth Circuit stated in dicta that the
parties must agree prior to trial that the results from the bellwether trial will be
binding on future proceedings.
This Note describes the historical context of collateral estoppel in cases with
multiple plaintiffs resulting from a common incident with a common defendant and
examines the Dodge court's rationale, explores the implications of the opinion, and
updates the status of the case after remand.
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Cotter Corporation operated a uranium mill near Canon City, Colorado, from
1958 to 1987 when it ceased operating the mill.' The milling process extracts
uranium from ore and produces two types of waste. The waste products eventually
contaminated an area approximately four miles in radius from the mill site including
the nearby town of Lincoln Park. Subsequently, the area was designated as a

* Class of 2003, University of New Mexico School of Law. The author would like to thank Professor M.E.
Occhialino for his guidance and his endless patience, Professor Blumenfeld for her words of encouragement, and
Allison Crist for her superior editorial help. I also want to thank my family for their love, encouragement, and sense
of humor.
1. A bellwether trial is "one that takes the lead." Dodge v. Cotter Corp., 203 F.3d 1190, 1199 n.l I (10th
Cir. 2000) (quoting WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (3d. ed. 1993)).

2. 203 F.3d 1190 (10th Cir. 2000).
3. Id.
at 1193.
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Superfund4 site. In 1983, the State of Colorado sued Cotter in federal court' for
continually violating the conditions of its operating license and for cleanup of the
contamination.' The State of Colorado settled with Cotter by a consent decree. The
decree established a panel to quantify exposures from the mill contaminants. The
panel assessed that possible health risks were low with the exception of exposure
from the drinking water.7
Approximately five hundred residents of Lincoln Park and three other nearby
towns brought an action in 1989 against the Cotter Corporation asserting that
negligent operation of the mill caused damage to their health and property. 8 The
plaintiffs requested damages exceeding $350 million and injunctive relief for
medical monitoring. 9 The 1989 suit alleged violation of the Comprehensive
Environmental Response Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA),' ° the Price
Anderson Act," and Colorado law. 2 Five hundred plaintiffs filed a class action
under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23,"3 but the district court denied class action

4. Congress established "the Superfund Program in 1980 to locate, investigate, and clean up the worst
[uncontrolled and hazardous waste] sites nationwide. The EPA administers the Superfund program in cooperation
with individual states and tribal governments. The office that oversees management of the program is the Office
of Emergency and Remedial Response (OERR)." United States Environmental Protection Agency, Superfund
available at http://www.epa.gov/superfund/about.htm (last visited Mar. 27, 2002).
5. Dodge, 203 F.3d at 1194 (citing State of Colorado v. Cotter Corp., No. 83 C 2389 (1983)).
6. Id. at 1193.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 1192.
9. Id. at 1194.
10. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (2000). This law created a tax and broad authority for the federal government
to respond to releases or threatened releases of hazardous substances from the chemical and petroleum industries
that may endanger the environment or the public. It established requirements for waste sites, provided for liability,
and established a trust fund when a responsible party could not be found. This law also provides for both short-term
and long-term solutions for remediation of Superfund sites. See United States Environmental Protection Agency,
Superfund CERCLA Overview, available at http://www.epa.gov/superfundlactionllaw/cercla.htm (last visited Mar.
27, 2002).
11. 42 U.S.C. § 2210(n)(2). The Price-Anderson Act is an amendment to the 1946 Atomic Energy Act. This
amendment limited the liability of the corporations licensed under the Atomic Energy Commission (established by
the Atomic Energy Act) to the amount available from private sources. In re TMI Litigation, 193 F.3d 613, 624 n.7
(3d Cir. 1999).
12. Colorado law for claims of negligence, trespass, and nuisance. Boughton v. Cotter Corporation, 65 F.3d
823, 825 (10th Cir. 1995).
13. FED. R. Civ. P. 23 class actions allows for multiple plaintiffs to be joined. Rule 23 is distinct from FED.
R. Civ. P. 18, Joinder of Claims and Remedies, because the number of plaintiffs is too large and impractical to be
joined and the manner in which the class members participate in the case also differs. Rule 23(a) states the
prerequisites the proposed class must meet before the court will certify the class. In addition to the requirements
listed in Rule 23(a), a class cannot be maintained unless one of the subsections of Rule 23(b) is met. Rule 23(b)(1)
allows for a class action to be maintained if separate actions against individuals would either create a risk of
inconsistent adjudications (Rule 23(b)(l)(A)), or it would impair or impede the individuals to protect their interests
(Rule 23(b)(I)(B). Rule 23(b)(I)(B) is most commonly used when the plaintiffs seek damages from a limited fund.
If independent actions were brought, the fund may be completely exhausted before all individuals could obtain
relief. Rule 23(b)(2) is equitable in nature and allows a class to be maintained if injunctive or declaratory relief with
respect to the entire class is the appropriate remedy. Rule 23(b)(3) states that a class may be maintained if the
common issues of law or fact predominate over the individual issues of law or fact and a class action is a superior
method of adjudicating the controversy. Rule 23(b)(3) is generally the choice of last resort and the relief sought is
generally monetary. Under 23(b)(3), the possible plaintiffs must be given notice and the opportunity to "opt out"
of the class if the individuals desire to control their own case. Maintaining a 23(b)(3) class certification can be costly
and burdensome because of the requirement of notice to all possible plaintiffs. STEVEN BAICKER-MCKEE, ET AL.,
A STUDENT'S GUIDE TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 355-68 (3d ed. 2000).
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status on three occasions. 4 The trial judge found that the plaintiffs' action for
damages failed to meet the statutory requirements under Rule 23(b)(3) because the
individual issues predominated over the common issues. 5 The individual issues
included awareness of contamination, the extent and nature of the injuries, the
amount of exposure, the amount of contamination, and water right ownership. 6 The
proposed class was defined by the geographic region in which the plaintiffs lived
and worked during a specified time period.' 7 The district court judge stated class
action status could not be maintained because "it could not be shown that the claims
of the proposed class members were all based on one legal or remedial theory."' 8
The parties and the trial court then agreed that the best method for handling the case
would be to select a set of bellwether plaintiffs and have a trial on their claims.' On
appeal of the denial of the class certification under Rule 23(b)(3), the Tenth Circuit
affirmed the trial court's denial of the request to certify the class. 20
Eight plaintiffs (Boughton plaintiffs) were then selected for the first bellwether
trial (Boughton v. Cotter Corp.2 ) as bellwether plaintiffs. The Boughton plaintiffs
listed eleven negligent acts and/or omissions in the complaint.22 These plaintiffs did
not have present personal injuries but sought damages in an action alleging
negligence for medical monitoring and damages for trespass and nuisance for failure
to properly control and/or contain the hazardous materials from the mill. 23 Cotter
admitted that its operation caused some contamination in limited areas but denied
that it breached any legal standard of duty.24 The jury returned a special verdict form
"for each plaintiff.. .for medical monitoring, trespass, and nuisance." 25 The jury did
not return a separate verdict form specifically stating what acts and/or omissions of
Cotter were negligent.26 However, the special jury verdicts for medical monitoring
for the individual plaintiffs asked whether Cotter was negligent and the jury found
Cotter was negligent. 27 The jury did not find that there was exposure to hazardous
materials and, therefore, did not award money damages for future medical
monitoring.28 The jury awarded monetary damages to all eight Boughton plaintiffs;
all eight prevailed on their claims of negligence, six of the plaintiffs prevailed on
claims of trespass, and three recovered on their claims of nuisance.29

14. The trial judge did not address whether Rule 23(b)(l)(A) would apply but ruled that the class did not
prove that the plaintiffs would be satisfied from a limited fund under Rule 23(b)(1)(B). The court also stated that
it was not proper to certify the class under Rule 23(b)(2) because the relief sought was primarily monetary.
Boughton, 65 F.3d at 827.
15. Id. at 826.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 828.
18. Id. at 826.
19. Id. at 828.
20. Id. at 826.
21. 65 F.3d 823 (10th Cir. 1995).
22. Dodge, 203 F.3d at 1196.
23. Id.
24. Id.at 1194.
25. Id. at 1195.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Boughton, 65 F.3d at 825.
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At the close of the Boughton trial, fourteen of the original five hundred plaintiffs
filed a separate lawsuit.3" These plaintiffs, the Dodge plaintiffs, filed an amended
complaint in the United States District Court for the District of Colorado. The
complaint was almost identical to that in the Boughton trial3 and rested on the claim
that Cotter breached its duty to control the contaminants.3 2 Prior to trial, the Dodge
plaintiffs prevailed on their motion for summary judgment on the issues of
negligence, trespass, and nuisance. Their motion was based on the jury verdict from
the Boughton trial using the doctrine of non-mutual, offensive collateral estoppel.33
At the conclusion of the Dodge trial, the jury returned verdicts in favor of the
plaintiffs and awarded damages for physical injuries and diminution in property
value.34 On appeal, the Tenth Circuit stated that it was not clear as a matter of law
that the issues of the Boughton and Dodge trials were the same. 35 The Dodge
plaintiffs' complaint differed because it had different dates of operation of the mill.
Additionally, because there was no indication of what specific act formed the basis
for the general finding of negligence in Boughton, the court stated that the seven
claims pertaining to hazardous releases in Dodge did not "clearly encompass[]"3 6 the
general finding of negligence of the first trial. The Tenth Circuit reversed and
remanded the case for a new trial, stating that the district court misapplied the
doctrine of collateral estoppel because the issues in the two cases were not
identical. 38 The court additionally stated that even if the issues were identical, the
Boughton verdict would not bind the Dodge plaintiffs because the parties had not
agreed to be bound by the bellwether trial results prior to the trial.39 The Tenth
Circuit's ruling regarding the misapplication of collateral estoppel and the dicta
regarding preclusive effect of test trials on future proceedings is the subject of this
Note.
L BACKGROUND
The doctrine of collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, economizes judicial
resources by decreasing relitigation of identical issues, allowing for consistency of
decisions and avoiding harassment of the adverse party.' Where issues are not fully,
fairly, and actually litigated, collateral estoppel might decrease efforts to
compromise and, therefore, increase litigation. 4

30.
31.
32.
33.

Dodge, 203 F.3d at 1192.
Id. at 1195.
Id.
Id. at 1197.

34. Id.

35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

Id. at 1199.
Id. at 1198.
Id.
Id. at 1200.
Id.
See BAICKER-MCKEE ET AL., supra note 13, at 86-87.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) JUDGMENTS § 27(e) (1982).
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A. CollateralEstoppel-Traditionaland Modem Approaches
The traditional requirements42 of collateral estoppel are (1) the parties are the
same or are in privity with the original parties (mutuality), (2) the cause of action is
different, (3) the issue or fact was actually litigated,43 and (4) the issue was
necessarily determined on the merits.' The requirement of mutuality stipulates that
the parties in the first lawsuit be the same as or in privity with the parties in the
second lawsuit. 45 Additionally, collateral estoppel initially was only available to
defendants as a defensive tactic.'
Some courts, including the federal courts and New Mexico courts, 47 have
switched from the traditional collateral estoppel to a modem approach that no longer
requires the element of mutuality.4 The modem rule now states that not all of the
parties need to be the same in the two lawsuits as long as the party against whom
collateral estoppel is to be used was a party or was in privity with the party in the
first lawsuit
and had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the first
49
lawsuit.
B. Offensive and Defensive Uses of CollateralEstoppel
In ParklaneHosiery Co., Inc. v. Shore,5 ° the use of non-mutual collateral estoppel
was expanded so it could be used as an offensive as well as a defensive tactic.5 In
defensive collateral estoppel, the defendant uses collateral estoppel as a "shield" that
would prevent plaintiffs from relitigating issues previously decided in favor of the
defendant.52 As an offensive tactic, collateral estoppel is used by a plaintiff as a
"sword" to avoid relitigating issues that the defendant had previously litigated and
lost in the earlier lawsuit.53 Parklaneallowed a plaintiff to use collateral estoppel
offensively to prevent a defendant from relitigating an issue that the defendant had
unsuccessfully litigated in a prior action against another party.' Not all jurisdictions
have adopted the offensive use of collateral estoppel, even if they have adopted the
modem approach to collateral estoppel."

42. See id. § 27.
43. Actually litigated encompasses several elements including vigorous defense, inconvenience of forum,
size of claim, competence and expertise of the attorney, and foreseeability of future litigation. Silva v. State, 106
N.M. 472, 476, 745 P.2d 380, 384 (1987); Schwartz v. Pub. Adm'n, 246 N.E.2d 725,729 (N.Y. 1969).
44. Sometimes this is broken down into two parts. The first part, "necessarily determined," is that the issue
decided in the first suit must be decided so that it is consistent with the judgment in the first suit. The second part,
"on the merits" applies only when the issues resolved in cases was decided on the merits. BAICKER-MCKEE ET AL.,
supra note 13, at 88.

45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
[offensive,
52.
53.
54.

55.

RESTATEMENTS (SECOND) JUDGMENTS §

27 (1982).

See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326-34 (1979).
See Silva, 106 N.M. at 476, 745 P.2d at 384.
Blonger-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Illinois Found., 402 U.S. 313, 328-29 (1971).
Parklane, 439 U.S. at 326-29 (citing Blonger-Tongue, 402 U.S. at 328-29).
439 U.S. 322 (1979).
Id. at 331. The court also stated that trial courts should have "broad discretion to determine when
non-mutual collateral estoppel] should be applied." Id.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) JUDGMENTS § 27 (1982).
See id.
Parklane,439 U.S. at 332-33.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) JUDGMENTS,

§ 29 cmnt. e (1982).
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In Parklane, the Supreme Court also addressed whether offensive collateral
estoppel was constitutional under the Seventh Amendment.56 In Parklane,the first
trial was a non-jury trial. In a second separate lawsuit, the defendants moved for
partial summary judgment asserting that Parklane Hosiery was collaterally estopped
from relitigating the issues resolved in the previous trial." Parklane Hosiery asserted
that allowing the defendants to use collateral estoppel would deny them their right
to trial by jury in the second case." The Court held there was no violation of the
Seventh Amendment because the right to trial by jury only pertains to issues of
fact.5 Even though a jury did not decide the first trial in Parklane, the court stated
that Parklane Hosiery already had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issues of
fact.' Therefore, there was no additional fact-finding function for a jury to resolve
in the subsequent action and no infringement on the parties' Seventh Amendment
rights.6'
The Parklanecourt stated that the real issue was whether it was a violation of the
defendant's due process to prevent the defendant from relitigating against a new
plaintiff an issue adversely resolved in a previous trial. 62 The court reasoned that the
defendant had one full opportunity to litigate and lost and, therefore, was not entitled
to a second full and fair opportunity because it would be a misallocation of
resources, both time and money, for all parties. 63 The requirement that a party have
a full and fair opportunity to litigate in the first lawsuit is a significant safeguard
against the possibility of violating a party's due process.'
C. New Mexico Law Regarding Offensive, Non-Mutual, CollateralEstoppel
Although not relevant to the Dodge trial,65 the New Mexico courts have adopted
the modern approach and have adopted the use of offensive as well as defensive
non-mutual collateral estoppel. The first time that a New Mexico court authorized
non-mutual offensive collateral estoppel was in Silva v. State.66 The court stated that
a moving party could use non-mutual, offensive collateral estoppel unless (1) "the
party could have easily joined the earlier action or [(2)] where the use of offensive
collateral estoppel would be unfair to a defendant."'67 The court stated unfairness
could arise
where a defendant had little incentive to defend vigorously in the first suit,
where the judgment relied upon as a basis for the estoppel is itself inconsistent
with one or more previous judgments in favor of the defendant, or where the

56. The Seventh amendment of the United States Constitution guarantees the right to trial by jury. U.S.
CONST. amend. VII.
57. Parklane, 439 U.S. at 325.
58. Id.at335.
59. Id.at325.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.at328.
64. Id.(citing Blonder-Tongue Lab., Inc. v. Univ. of Illinois Found., 342 U.S. 313, 329 (1971)).
65. Dodge is a case out of the Colorado State Courts. This section explains its relevance to New Mexico law.
66. 106 N.M. 472, 745 P.2d 380 (1987).
67. Id.at 475, 745 P.2d at 384 (citing Parklane,439 U.S. at 330-31).

Summer 2002]

COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL

second action affords the defendant procedural opportunities unavailable in the
first action that could have easily caused a different result.6'
Under the first proposition, cases stemming from denial of class action status
normally would not be precluded from the use of offensive non-mutual collateral
estoppel if the plaintiffs could not have easily joined the earlier action.69 In Dodge,
however, the plaintiffs were named parties in the lawsuit, though not parties in the
Boughton case, and were unable to join in that first suit.7' The second proposition
is subjective and therefore can be determined to be either fair or unfair based on the
particular circumstances of the case.
D. The Tenth Circuit Law Regarding Offensive, Non-Mutual, CollateralEstoppel
Dodge restates the Tenth Circuit's requirements for collateral estoppel. In Dodge,
the Tenth Circuit has stated slightly different requirements for collateral estoppel
than that of the modem approach previously discussed. In addition to the
requirement that the party against whom collateral estoppel is sought to be used was
a party to or in privity with a party in the first action, the court requires" that
1)the issue previously decided is identical with the one presented in the action
in question, 2) the prior action has been finally adjudicated on the merits, 3) the
party against whom the doctrine is invoked was a party, or in privity with a
party, to the prior adjudication, and 4) the party against whom the doctrine
is
72
raised had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in a prior action.
These requirements do not include that the issue be "necessarily determined,"
which is different than the generally accepted elements of collateral estoppelY."
However, the Dodge decision only focuses on one of the required elements of
collateral estoppel, "identical issues."74
IV. RATIONALE
The Tenth Circuit noted the existence of three of the four requirements of
collateral estoppel in this case.75 The record established that Cotter, the party against
whom the litigation was brought, had been a party to the prior action, the final
adjudication was on the merits, and the defendants had a full and fair opportunity
to litigate the issue.76 The Tenth Circuit then focused on the question of whether the
issue previously decided in Boughton was identical to the one presented in this case.

68. Id. at 475, 745 P.2d at 384.

69. Id.
70. See Dodge v. Cotter Corp., 203 F.3d 1190 (10th Cir. 2000).
71. Id. at 1198 (citing Murdock v. Ute Indian Tribe of Uintah & Ouray Reservation, 975 F.2d 683,687 (10th
Cir. 1992)).
72. Id.,followed by Matosantos Commercial Corp. v. Applebee's Int'l, Inc., 245 F.3d 1203, 1207 (10th Cir.
2001).
73. See supra Section iliA.
74. Dodge, 203 F.3d at 1198-1200.
75. Id.at 1198.
76. Id.
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A. IdenticalIssues
The Boughton complaint contained eleven allegations of Cotter's negligence. The
jury instructions in Boughton defined negligence, but "the jury was not instructed
on the specific duty [that Cotter] allegedly breached."" Additionally, the verdict
form did not specify what act or acts of Cotter substantiated the general finding of
negligence by Cotter.78 The jury returned a special verdict for each plaintiff
regarding the plaintiffs' individual claims but did not return a separate form
specifically stating what acts of Cotter's constituted negligence.79 This failure of the
jury form to state what specific acts the general finding of negligence was based on
led to the reversal of the plaintiffs' partial summary judgment regarding collateral
estoppel."0 The Dodge plaintiffs contend that the Boughton trial was about the
release of contaminants.8" Seven of the eleven allegations in the Dodge complaint
related to releases of contaminants and the plaintiffs therefore contend that the seven
allegations clearly encompass the general finding of negligence found in the
Boughton trial.8" The court denied application of collateral estoppel and
distinguished the issues in Dodge from the Boughton issues in two ways: (1) the
years of alleged negligence were different and (2) the seven of eleven allegations in
the Dodge trial did not clearly encompass the general finding of negligence found
in Boughton. 3 Additionally, the jury instructions in Boughton stated that the jury
should not take into consideration the claims of the remaining plaintiffs because they
may or may not be represented by the bellwether plaintiffs' claims."
B. Alternative Rationale:No CollateralEstoppel Effect in Bellwether Litigation
Absent Agreement of the Parties
The absence of proof of identical issues was not the only reason that precluded
the plaintiffs from using collateral estoppel in this case. In dicta, the court stated that
even if the plaintiffs had met this requirement by proving the issues were identical,
86
the Tenth Circuit, relying on the Third Circuit's decision" in In re TMI Litigation,
would have still ruled that the results from Boughton would not be binding on the
Dodge plaintiffs because the parties failed to clearly state that Boughton would be
binding on future litigation. 7

77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1194.

Id. at 1200.
Id. at 1198.
Id.
Id.
Id.at 1199.
Id.at 1200.
193 F.3d 613 (3d Cir. 1999).
Dodge, 203 F.3d at 1194.
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C. In re TMI Litigation and the Third Circuit'sRationale
8
In In re TMI Litigation,"
two thousand possible plaintiffs were residents living
near Three Mile Island in 1979 at the time of the nuclear reactor incident.89 The
cases were filed in the "1980s in state and federal district courts in Pennsylvania,
New Jersey and Mississippi"' for personal injury claims resulting from possible
exposure to radiation, which allegedly started in the early 1980s."9 In 1985, the cases
filed in the Dauphin County Common Pleas Court were consolidated for pretrial
purposes under the caption "Cases Consolidated I.92 The cases filed in state court
' 93
after 1984 were "consolidated under the caption 'Cases Consolidated II."'

Following the enactment of the Price-Anderson Amendments Act of 1988, 9' all of
the defendants removed the actions pending in state court to the United States
District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania. 5 Following the removal, the
district court held a conference and consolidated all of the cases under the heading
"In Re TMI Litigation" "to reduce the number of duplicative plaintiffs and suits... [as
well as the number of cases] for administrative purposes." 96 The plaintiffs and
defendants then agreed to a stipulated order for consolidation.97 The stipulation for
consolidation required that the pleadings bear the caption "In Re TMI Litigation" as
well as "This document Relates to: All Plaintiffs [within the consolidated trials]" or
"This document Relates to: [the number of applicable plaintiffs]."98
The plaintiffs proposed a case management plan that included a test trial of ten
plaintiffs, half chosen by each side. 99 This proposal was approved four years after
consolidation of the three trials. " The ten plaintiffs presented expert witnesses, but
the court found that the opinions of the witnesses were scientifically unreliable and
thus were inadmissible.' ° ' The court then granted the defendants' motion for

88. 193 F.3d 613.
89. Three Mile Island is located near Middletown, Pennsylvania, and is the site of two nuclear reactors.
Chains of events led to a nuclear reactor accident causing small amounts of radioactivity to be released into the
atmosphere. At the time of the accident all children and pregnant women within a five-mile radius of the plant were
evacuated, and all others within a ten-mile radius were told to remain indoors as a precautionary measure to limit
the possibility of exposure to radiation. The amounts of radiation to which the individuals were exposed was
approximately I millirem. In comparison, the total radiation received from a complete set of chest x-rays is
approximately 6 millirem. The reactor was shutdown and is currently being monitored until the operating license
expires in 2014, at which time the reactors will be decommissioned. Nuclear Waste, Three Mile Island, Background,
available at, http://environment.about.com/ibrary/weekly/blaro.htmiam--dpile&terms=Three+Mile+lsland (last
visited Mar. 27, 2002).
90. In re TMI, 193 F.3d at 624.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 625.
93. Id.
94. 42 U.S.C. § 2014(h) (2000). This act "provided for consolidation of actions, including those already
filed, in one federal district court." In re TMI, 193 F.3d at 625 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2210(n) (2000)).
95. In re TMI, 193 F.3d at 625.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 627.
100. Id.
101. M.
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summary judgment"° for lack of proof of causation."°3 The pleading caption stated
that it related to "all plaintiffs."" The defendants stated that it should be binding on
°5
all plaintiffs, not just the ten trial plaintiffs and the district court agreed." The
district court stated that the summary judgment motion "would be binding on all
°
plaintiffs because the broad evidentiary issues were common to all plaintiffs."'"
On appeal, the Third Circuit reversed and found that applying summary judgment
to the non-trial plaintiffs would violate their Seventh Amendment right to trial by
jury because there was no indication that the non-trial plaintiffs were given an
opportunity to protect their substantive rights. 7 The court stated that issue
preclusion had not developed to the point where the court can bind plaintiffs when
they were not parties to the first trial.' The Third Circuit stated that the essential
°
issue under Rule 42 °9 was that consolidation would economize judicial resources'
but does not narrow the rights of the parties or redefine the causes of action so they
become a single cause of action."' The Third Circuit explicitly stated that it would
be improper to extend the doctrine of collateral estoppel because the non-trial
plaintiffs were not party to the proceeding." 2 The Third Circuit reasoned that the
parties did not have a full and fair opportunity to litigate, and out of fairness to the
not be
non-trial plaintiffs, the court stated that the decision in the first trial
3 would
agreed."
had
parties
all
that
indication
an
was
binding unless there
D. The Tenth Circuit'sHolding in Dodge
The Tenth Circuit agreed with the Third Circuit and found that in addition to
meeting the requirements for the application of collateral estoppel, the Dodge
plaintiffs would not be bound by the previous results, unless they had agreed to be
bound prior to the bellwether trial." 4 The Tenth Circuit stated that, "[i]f the parties
intended to bind subsequent litigation with the results of prior test trials, the record
must clearly memorialize that agreement. Their failure to do that here leaves
important substantive rights at the mercy of trial tactics. ' Using this language, the
court then reversed the United States District Court for the District of Colorado's

102. Id. at 628.
103. Id. at 623. The court stated that this holding was narrow in that it would only apply to the common
evidentiary issues, otherwise it "would obviate all benefits of having consolidated the many separate actions." Id.
at 628.
104 Id. at 628.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 725.
108. Id. at 726.
109. FED. R. Civ. P. 42(a) states, "Consolidation. When actions involving a common question of law or fact
are pending before the court, it may order ajoint hearing or trial of any or all the matters in issue in the actions; it
may order all the actions consolidated, and it may make such orders concerning proceedings therein as may tend
to avoid unnecessary costs or delay." See BAICKER-MCKEE ET AL., supra note 13, at 549.
110. In re TMi, 193 F.3d at 724.
i11.Id.
112. Id. at 726.
113. Id. at 725.
114. Dodge, 203 F.3d at 1200.
115. Id.
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grant of partial summary judgment with regard to negligence, trespass, and
nuisance." 6
The Tenth Circuit focused on fairness to the parties and stated that "TMI must
remind us to focus on what was actually litigated and who should be bound and
benefit from those results. That concern must override arguments about inconsistent
results and time-consuming relitigation of the same issue."' " The court additionally
stated that it was mindful of the impact on this case but the parties should be more
careful in drafting their verdict forms in test trials."'
V. ANALYSIS & IMPLICATIONS
In incidents resulting in multiple trials against a common defendant, the Tenth
Circuit now requires that the parties must clearly state that all future litigation is
bound by the result in the first trial in addition to proving the elements of collateral
estoppel." 9 In doing so, the court has narrowed the use of collateral estoppel so that
it does not apply to cases resulting in multiple plaintiffs from a common incident
against a common defendant.
The benefit of collateral estoppel is judicial economy. In a case where class
certification has been denied, it is assumed that there will be multiple trials in an
effort to adjudicate the rights of all of the parties harmed. This is especially true in
a case such as this where the Dodge case was pending at the conclusion of the
Boughton trial. Similarly, where the case is a toxic tort, the multiple proceedings
will have similar if not identical claims, with the differences being in the personal
injuries of the plaintiffs.
The first question that arises from this decision is whether collateral estoppel
should apply in a case that follows a bellwether trial. The purpose of a bellwether
trial is to essentially "test the waters" and see how the other pending cases would
turn out for reasons of judicial economy. If certain issues can be resolved in a small
trial setting, then they do not need to be relitigated in a more complex setting, thus
saving judicial resources as well as time. By choosing to not bind future plaintiffs
to the results of the bellwether trial, the bellwether trial is only serving the purpose
of "testing the waters." If future parties were to be bound by the bellwether trial, the
bellwether trial would serve the purpose of adjudicating the rights of a large number
of plaintiffs who are not party to the first trial. In doing so, this would alter the
strategies in allowing or denying class actions.
There are two "default positions" available for the courts in bellwether trials. The
first position available is that collateral estoppel applies unless the parties agree prior
to trial that the results of the first trial will not be binding on future plaintiffs. The
second position available is that the results of the first trial are not binding on future
plaintiffs unless the parties agree that the results are binding before the trial. The
default positions are only relevant in cases where bellwether trials will be used.
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The parties that must agree to be bound are all possible plaintiffs and defendants, not just the trial
defendants, and judge. Dodge, 203 F.3d at 1200 (relying on Inre TMI Litigation, 193 F.3d at 726).
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The Tenth Circuit has adopted the second position as the default position with
Dodge. It now becomes the job of the attorney for the plaintiffs to negotiate with the
defendant whether or not the results of a bellwether trial will be binding on future
trials. This negotiation is straightforward if one attorney represents all plaintiffs. If
individual plaintiffs have separate attorneys, however, then each attorney will have
to agree that the results of the bellwether trial will be binding on future proceedings.
The default position of the Tenth Circuit did not affect the outcome of this case
because the absence of identical issues precluded application of collateral estoppel
in any event.
The Tenth Circuit has chosen the better default position. This raises another issue,
however: can some plaintiffs choose to be bound by the result while others choose
not to be similar to the "opt-out" provision in Rule 23(b)(3)? 2 ° Once class action
status has been denied, the number of plaintiffs and attorneys becomes more
apparent. A plaintiff not represented by the attorney in the bellwether trial might
prefer not to be bound by the decisions of an attorney that is not bound by any duty
to represent them.
Defendants would prefer to have a failed class action and have all the plaintiffs
bound by the results in a bellwether trial. By binding the plaintiffs, the defendants'
resources of time and money are saved by limiting the amount of discovery to a
smaller number of plaintiffs and injuries needed to present in the defendant's case.
Setting the default position to the plaintiffs being bound by the results in a
bellwether trial would also have the effect of encouraging settlements that would
most likely under compensate plaintiffs. The plaintiffs might be afraid of being
bound by an unfavorable result in a bellwether trial and therefore would want to
settle the case to ensure a favorable outcome. Allowing plaintiffs to "opt-out" of
being bound by decisions of bellwether trials would resolve this problem but would
also have the effect of increasing litigation.
Second, in circuits where the default position has not been set, what is the duty
of the attorney and/or judge? In other circuits, the default position has not been
decided; attorneys should be aware that there is a possibility that the plaintiffs may
or may not be bound by bellwether and test trials depending on the default position
of the court. What should attorneys do to ensure that the results from a prior
bellwether trial have the effect the attorney was expecting?
The answer before Dodge seemed straightforward from the standpoint that
collateral estoppel had already addressed this issue. As long as the four requirements
of collateral estoppel are met, it is apparent from the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure that the outcome would be binding on future proceedings if the identical
issue were in question against the same party or a party in privity with the party
from the first action. Therefore, the judge would not have to make a statement
regarding whether the outcome of one trial would be binding on future proceedings
and the attorneys would be left to methods of litigation to prove the elements of

120. FED. R. Civ. PRO. 23(c). Rule 23(c) allows plaintiffs that can be included in a Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23(b)(3) class to be given the opportunity to "opt-out" of the class. See BAICKER-McKEE ET AL., supra
note 13, at 367.
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collateral estoppel. As Dodge has established, however, just proving the elements
of collateral estoppel is not sufficient in bellwether/test trial litigation.
Unfortunately, a court's default position on this matter is not known until it has
either been addressed in the local rules or it has been raised in a trial. This
uncertainty is not unknown territory in the field of law, but it adds one more
complexity to already complex issues. The attorney should decide prior to trial that
the results from the bellwether trial will be binding or not and have the agreement
between the parties in writing. This agreement has to be between all plaintiffs, not
just trial plaintiffs and defendants.
The third issue is indicated in the Tenth Circuit's opinion:' 2' how detailed should
the special verdict forms be? This case is based on the fact that the verdict form
from the first trial did not specifically state what acts gave rise to Cotter's
negligence. The seven claims relating to negligence were not sufficient to show that
the issues of the two trials were identical.
Verdict forms 22 have become an essential part of the trial because they help focus
the issues to be resolved by the jury. The verdict forms can indicate what issues
were not clearly presented to the jury or lacked enough foundation for the jury to
find in favor of the attorney's client. More importantly, they provide evidence to
show that the issues in one trial were identical to the issues in the second trial.
Attorneys should try to structure the verdict forms as specifically as they can. When
drafting verdict forms, the attorneys should consider what information they can
glean from the jury's answers to the questions presented. Attorneys must plan their
tactics far in advance, especially when multiple trials are pending as in the case of
a failed class action.
VI. CONCLUSION AND STATUS OF THE REMAND
Collateral estoppel is important because it saves judicial resources as well as the
time and money of the parties by preventing relitigation of identical issues. In cases
where class action status has been denied, however, it is important to ensure that a
balance is struck between the complexity of case management, judicial economy,
and fairness to the parties involved. Once class action status has been denied, the
balance of power between the parties shifts from being in favor of numerous
plaintiffs to being in favor of the defendant. In cases resulting from a denial of class
action status, there is the likelihood that different attorneys will represent the
multiple plaintiffs. The Dodge opinion exemplifies the necessity for attorneys to be
detail oriented and the need for communication between the multiple parties'
attorneys in complex cases where there are multiple plaintiffs who have been
harmed from a common incident with a common defendant. The outcome of this
case illustrates that if class action status has been denied and a bellwether trial is
proposed, the attorney needs to state whether the results of the bellwether trial will
be binding in future litigation if the elements of collateral estoppel can be met. Once
that determination has been made, it is equally important to be precise in drafting
complaints and verdicts so that they can provide evidence to meet the elements of
121. Dodge, 203 F.3dat 1200.
122.
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collateral estoppel. It is equally important to note that the implications of this Note
are also applicable to claim preclusion, res judicata.
Two other trials, Dodge Ii and Dodge III, followed this case, Dodge L This case
was retried after Dodge H. In Dodge II, the jury found Cotter negligent. ' The jury
in Dodge III also resulted in a verdict for the plaintiffs finding both negligence and
wanton misconduct on the part of the Cotter Corporation.'24 The plaintiffs were
awarded approximately $42 million plus interest.'25 The Cotter Corporation has
2 6 The plaintiffs are
appealed all of the cases and has posted a bond for $43 million.
12 7
notice.
of
timeliness
on
seeking to dismiss the appeal based
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